Quan Vu's capture and execution by Dong Ngo's forces at Lam Tho marked a pivotal moment in the Three Kingdoms' political landscape. This event significantly altered the situation for Shu Han, leading to various upheavals.
The loss of Jing Province and the sudden demise of Quan Vu became a turning point in the Three Kingdoms' political maneuvering, triggering numerous shifts in the landscape. This event not only inflicted heavy losses on the forces of Shu Han but also resulted in the tragic demise of Quan Vu and his son.
The fall of Jing Province and the untimely death of Quan Vu not only inflicted severe losses on the forces of Shu Han but also led to the demise of Quan Vu and his son. Furthermore, it rendered Gia Cat Luong's strategy at Long Trung unfeasible, ultimately leading to internal conflicts within Shu Han.

Quan Vu was captured and executed by Dong Ngo's forces in early 220 AD, marking a significant turning point in the political landscape of the Three Kingdoms era.
In the same year, driven by the desire for revenge against Quan Vu and the ambition to reclaim Jing Province, Liu Bei mobilized his forces to attack Dong Ngo recklessly, disregarding the counsel of his advisors. The outcome was a decisive defeat for Liu Bei and the Shu Han army at Di Lang around August 222. Many generals perished, and Shu Han suffered significant losses, forcing Liu Bei to flee to the city of Bạch Đế.
According to historical records, the failure at Di Lang proved fatal for Liu Bei, despite later reconciling with Dong Ngo. Moreover, unable to retake crucial territories like Jing Province, Gia Cat Luong's strategic plan outlined in 'Long Trung Diplomacy' became increasingly impractical. Additionally, Shu Han's campaign against Tao Wei to restore the Han dynasty faced even greater challenges. Overwhelmed by grief, Liu Bei's health deteriorated significantly, ultimately leading to his severe illness and death in Bạch Đế in 223.

Driven by the fervor to avenge Quan Vu and recapture Jing Province, Liu Bei suffered a major defeat at Di Lang, inflicting significant losses on Shu Han.
Following Liu Bei's devastating defeat at Di Lang, the strength of Shu Han declined drastically, making it the weakest among the three states of Wei, Shu Han, and Wu.
Under normal circumstances, this would have been the ideal time for Wei to annihilate Shu Han. However, strangely, Tao Wei, son of Tao Thao and emperor of Wei, inexplicably remained inactive, failing to seize this opportunity to eliminate Shu Han.
Many of Tao Wei's subordinates couldn't comprehend why the emperor overlooked such a favorable opportunity. Even a talented strategist like Tu Ma Yi took 22 years to uncover the reasons behind Tao Wei's decision.
What is that?
It took Tư Mã Ý 22 years to understand Tào Phi's decision.

Tào Phi made a surprising decision after the disastrous defeat of Shu Han at Di Lang.
Many believed that Tào Phi's choice to attack Dong Ngo instead of Shu Han was primarily due to the weakness of Shu Han, which no longer posed a threat to Tào Wei. However, what Tào Phi didn't anticipate was Tôn Quyền, the ruler of Dong Ngo, initially aligning with Tào Wei, even receiving the title of King of Wu, but later breaking away in 222.
Furthermore, after the battle of Di Lang, the power of Dong Ngo surged. Perhaps Tào Phi considered Dong Ngo to be the real threat to the fledgling authority of Tào Wei at that time, hence turning to attack this state.
Attacking Shu Han is not easy.
After the battle of Di Lang, Shu Han indeed suffered severe weakening, but this does not mean the country lacked the opportunity to turn the tide. Tào Phi, the Emperor of Wei, decided not to attack Shu Han because he recognized that Wei was truly incapable of doing so.
Tào Phi understood that while Shu Han was weakened, its terrain, especially Hán Trung, was very complex. This place is easy to defend but difficult to attack, not suitable for carrying out a large-scale offensive. Therefore, Tào Phi believed that even if Shu Han were to be defeated, he and Wei would have to pay a hefty price.

Vương Bình was a general who achieved many victories for Shu Han. Among them, he once led an army to block the attack of the Wei forces in 244.
It took Tào Phi's mindset until 22 years later for Tư Mã Ý to understand. Specifically, in 244, Tào Sảng, a Wei courtier, commanded 100,000 troops from Lạc Khẩu to attack Hán Trung, aiming to seize the opportunity to annihilate Shu Han. Unfortunately, Tào Sảng not only failed to carry out this task but also was intercepted and defeated by the Shu forces (then less than 30,000) led by Vương Bình in the mountainous region of Hán Trung.
When reinforcements from Thành Đô arrived, the Shu Han army cut off the Wei army's supply route. At the same time, an epidemic broke out in Đê Giang and Quan Trung, causing a shortage of provisions for the Wei army. Tào Sảng and the Wei army could not withstand the pressure and had to retreat.

After 22 years, Tư Mã Ý finally understood Tào Phi's unconventional decision not to attack Shu Han.
After this battle, the Wei army suffered heavy losses, and the reputation and prestige of Tào Sảng were greatly affected. The losses in the attack on Shu Han contributed to Tào Sảng's ultimate defeat at the hands of Tư Mã Ý in 249, when this statesman and military strategist launched the famous Cao Binh Rebellion in history.
Clearly, after 22 years, someone as intelligent and patient as Tư Mã Ý only realized the extent of Tào Phi's wisdom with the decision not to attack Shu Han after Liu Bei's defeat at Di Lang. The daring attack of Wei on Shu Han at that time was not a futile effort after all. Standing in the position of a newly crowned emperor with the country's situation still unstable, Tào Phi's decision was entirely correct.
References: Sohu, 163, Baidu
