Top 8 Intriguing Facts about the Dien Bien Phu Campaign

As the largest battle of the First Indochina War, naturally, both our side and the enemy had diverse forces. However, the largest and most diverse force in this battle was... our military's transportation labor force, numbering up to 260,000 people. Foremost among them were the 20,000 bicycle courier units, each capable of carrying cargo ranging from 200 to 300 kg, setting a record of up to 325 kg. Throughout the 56-day campaign, our transportation labor force transported a total of 14,950 tons of rice, 266 tons of salt, 62 tons of sugar, 577 tons of meat, 565 tons of dry rations to the battlefield, after deducting roadside consumption.

The military force involved peaked at 55,000 people, belonging to 4 out of 6 infantry divisions, 1 engineer - artillery division, and various other support and affiliated units. The number of artillery pieces, mortars, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and machine guns did not exceed nearly 300 units, the largest ever at that time.

There were 262,000 civilian workers and youth volunteers from Viet Bac, Regions 3, Region 4, and locally in the Northwest participating in road construction, transportation of food, ammunition, equipment, medical care for the wounded and sick soldiers... serving the campaign.

With 628 transport trucks, 21,000 bicycle couriers, about 20,000 other transport vehicles such as pack horses, barges, boats, porters, the logistics forces brought to Dien Bien Phu 25,500 tons of food, thousands of tons of meat, vegetables; thousands of tons of weapons, ammunition, equipment, medicines ensuring prolonged combat for the troops.

On April 15, 1954, to boost the morale of the troops, the French prematurely promoted General Christian de Castries (Dơ Cát) to the rank of General. Subsequently, General, along with a pink letter from his wife and some wine, pastries were airdropped to... our troops' positions. After surrendering and being captured as a prisoner of war, he was personally handed the aforementioned items. In addition to being a prisoner of war for Vietnam, he had also been a prisoner of war for Germany in 1940 but escaped in 1941.

During the interrogation, General Dơ Cát requested to express some impressions about General Vo Nguyen Giap. He said: “General Giap is an intelligent and courageous person, a skilled guerrilla commander. He is also proficient in politics, in communism. We have seen that clearly. Through the Dien Bien Phu battle, I see General Giap not only excels in commanding guerrilla warfare but also excels in commanding positional battles, coordinating combined arms operations, and even in military deception against enemy intelligence.

I am extremely surprised as I do not know if General Vo Nguyen Giap graduated from any of our high-level military academies. Did Giap secretly study in the Soviet Union? Sometimes I think that perhaps General Giap is one of the few individuals who were trained at our Saint Cyr Military Academy and now he works for Viet Minh? Or did General Giap graduate from a military academy in the United States? But I admit that General Giap is more knowledgeable and wiser in military matters, more talented than I have ever been, even more than General Conhi and Admiral Nava.”.

The tale of artillery pulling during the Dien Bien Phu Campaign may have long been entrenched in each of us, finding its way into poetry and history books. But few realize that, to counter the modern French counterfire equipment of that time, our troops resorted to a very... rudimentary method. Artillery commanders established dummy artillery positions using charred wooden logs fashioned into fake cannons, with the barrels pointing skyward. When the real cannons fired, soldiers in charge of the dummy positions from within the trenches threw smoke bombs into the air, diverting 80% of the French counterfire onto the dummy cannons, thus safeguarding our precious artillery pieces. Throughout the campaign, our forces lost only one 105mm cannon.

Due to the comparison of forces and inferior equipment, our military often opted for guerrilla tactics, seeking out enemy vulnerabilities, avoiding strong points, and striking weak spots. But at Dien Bien Phu, we struck at the strongest enemy positions and emerged victorious. Previously, we could only eliminate a single outpost held by an enemy platoon, but at Dien Bien Phu, our troops attacked a stronghold complex with 49 interconnected outposts, at its peak holding 17 enemy platoons. This demonstrates the advancement in the position and strength of the resistance; the level of command, tactics, and capabilities of the troops, as well as weapons and equipment, had significantly improved and progressed.

In the initial plans of both sides, there was no intention to organize a decisive battle in Dien Bien Phu. However, when the 316th Division marched to the Northwest to liberate Lai Chau town, French intelligence discovered this and alerted Nava in mid-November 1953. Subsequently, the French Commander-in-Chief hastily dropped six paratrooper battalions into Dien Bien Phu on November 20 and 21, 1953, to prevent our forces from advancing to Lai Chau and into Laos.

Realizing this as an opportunity to eliminate the enemy, the General Staff decided to reinforce the troops at Dien Bien Phu. Seeing this, the French continued to bolster their forces and tightly organized defense positions to develop the area into a strong defensive stronghold, aiming to attract our main forces for destruction. Thus, from not being part of the plans, within just two weeks, both sides, without informing each other, came to the decision to choose Dien Bien Phu, a historic rendezvous, as the battleground. Dien Bien Phu quickly became the focal point of both sides' plans.

In late 2011, EMOBI GAMES Vietnam released the first 3D FPS game (first-person shooter) based on the events of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign titled 7554 (7/5/1954).

After a few years, the publisher ceased selling the game due to poor revenue, but still encouraged players to use a cracked version to learn more about Vietnamese history, especially the younger generation.

Bicycles in 1954 were a valuable asset, but people were willing to contribute them to serve the campaign, reinforcing them as cargo bikes to transport food, weapons, and ammunition to the Dien Bien Phu battlefield.

Each cargo bike initially carried 100kg of food. Later, improvements gradually increased the capacity to 200-300kg, with one civilian from Phu Tho province managing to carry 352kg.

The cargo bike could carry ten times the amount of rice compared to a person carrying it manually, while the roadside meal was only enough for one person. Thus, one person and one cargo bike were equivalent to the labor of 100 porters. Calculated, the 20,000-strong bicycle brigade equaled the labor of 2 million porters, without mentioning that they were faster when returning.

The Dien Bien Phu campaign is the greatest triumph of our army and people during the 9 years of resistance, and at the same time, the heaviest defeat of French colonialism and U.S. intervention.

In the battle of Dien Bien Phu, our troops completely defeated the enemy's highest war effort, annihilating and capturing the largest number of enemy troops from a Western military power in modern history. Therefore, the victory at Dien Bien Phu had the greatest impact, becoming the decisive factor in breaking the will to continue the war of France, forcing them to choose a negotiated solution to end the war, which was a military and political defeat.

In Dien Bien Phu, the French command focused on airdropping supplies to the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. They knew very well the involuntary provision of daily supplies to the Vietnamese army, the quantity, and the types: weapons, ammunition, food...

They knew it very well but there was no way to restrict or overcome it. They knew it and still had to continue doing it with an increasing quantity day by day, with a duration not just for 1 - 2 days, 1 - 2 weeks but extended for 34 days. France mobilized 100% of the air force to supply day and night but still couldn't meet the needs of the stomachs at Dien Bien Phu. They had to rely on the new type of transport aircraft from the United States to airdrop supplies to Dien Bien Phu.

General Hoang Van Thai (then Chief of Staff of the Dien Bien Phu Front) recounted: Up to one-third of the French supply dropped onto our battlefield, including items we urgently needed, which were either depleted or unavailable, such as dried plasma, heavy machine gun bullets, artillery shells...

In mid-April, to prepare for the major assault, our 105mm artillery shells were running low. Without artillery shells, the attack couldn't proceed. General Vo Nguyen Giap recounted: 'We urgently telegraphed China for assistance, but China also had very few 105mm shells. They managed to gather 7,400 shells from their depots and swiftly sent them to us. However, these shells only reached Vietnam by the end of May 1954, by which time the Dien Bien Phu battle had concluded.'

So where did the shells come from for the battle? The French air force airdropped a total of 5,000 105mm shells into our territory. Without the enemy's supply, perhaps the battle couldn't have been won on May 7th.