Buzz
In 1972, the far-right extremist Vincenzo Vinciguerra set off a car bomb in the Italian town of Peteano. As planned, the bombing was initially blamed on left-wing militants. Years later, Vinciguerra revealed his reasoning: “Our movement is dedicated to targeting...ordinary people, creating chaos. This state of fear will rally the public behind a powerful regime, even if it means sacrificing democracy. We call it the ‘strategy of tension.’”
Vinciguerra’s bombing was merely one of many violent acts committed by a confusing mix of right-wing groups and shadowy organizations, often with the implicit backing of Italy's security forces. The goal was to erode public support for democracy while falsely implicating communists and anarchists in the bloodshed. While the full scope of this conspiracy remains unclear, the key aspects of the ‘strategy of tension’ are now understood, along with the names of several groups involved.
10. The OAS
In the early 1960s, a shadowy French extremist known as Yves Guillou arrived in Portugal. Though his true identity was Guillou, he often used the alias Yves Guerin-Serac. He chose Portugal because of his admiration for its authoritarian regime, which was fighting a brutal war against the independence movements in its African colonies. Thousands of lives were lost before the fascist government was ousted in 1974, and the new regime granted independence to Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau.
The bloodshed in Africa drew Guerin-Serac’s attention, particularly as he had been radicalized during France’s devastating colonial war in Algeria. The conflict, marked by horrific brutality on both sides, claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and left France in turmoil. However, the European settlers in Algeria were determined to maintain the colonial system and were furious when President Charles de Gaulle proposed a referendum on the issue, resulting in overwhelming votes for independence in both Algeria and France.
In reaction to what they saw as a betrayal of France’s imperial legacy, a group of right-wing Franco-Algerians formed the OAS (Organisation de l’Armee Secrete), which effectively seized control of the European areas in Algiers and Oran. The OAS launched a series of terrorist attacks in both France and Algeria, including multiple failed assassination attempts on de Gaulle. As independence loomed, the OAS unleashed a “frenzy of violence,” killing at least 2,360 people during the 15 months leading up to June 1962.
A decorated veteran from the 1950s wars in Korea and Indochina, Guerin-Serac became a fervent member of the OAS. However, he was unwilling to abandon terrorism after the group's collapse in 1962: “The others have laid down their weapons, but not I. After the OAS, I escaped to Portugal to continue the battle and elevate it to its rightful scale—which is to say, a global scale.”
9. Aginter Press
In Portugal, Guerin-Serac established Aginter Press, ostensibly a news agency similar to Reuters or the Associated Press. In reality, however, this served merely as a facade that enabled Aginter’s agents to travel without suspicion. Aginter was actually a fascist paramilitary organization dedicated to fighting communism worldwide. The group openly despised democracy, considering it weak, and embraced the belief that false-flag terrorist operations could be an effective method for undermining the left and empowering the far-right.
An internal document summarized Aginter’s core beliefs:
The initial phase of political action should aim to establish the conditions that favor the emergence of chaos. [ . . . ] In our view, the first step should be to dismantle the structure of the democratic state, disguised as communist and pro-Chinese activities. [ . . . ] Additionally, we have infiltrated these groups, and we must align our actions with their ideological mindset—propaganda and actions that will appear to originate from our communist adversaries.
8. Ordre Et Tradition
These objectives gained the support of Portugal’s dictatorship, and the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) were reportedly responsible for funneling millions in funding to Aginter. The CIA also contributed, and the “news agency” soon extended its reach beyond Portugal. As noted by Italian sociologist Franco Ferraresi, Guerin-Serac built a formidable private espionage network across Europe and southern Africa. By the late 1960s, it was “on par with, if not superior to, the secret service of a medium-sized country.”
Aginter also enlisted right-wing mercenaries to engage in colonial wars in Africa and operated training camps focused on counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla warfare. Over time, this training expanded to include “covert action techniques” such as bomb-making, assassination, and propaganda. Operatives trained by Aginter have been linked to the murders of African freedom fighters Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral, as well as Portuguese general Humberto Delgado. (However, there are credible alternative theories for all three assassinations.)
After 1969, Aginter shifted its attention from Africa to Europe. Guerin-Serac founded a subsidiary called “Ordre Et Tradition,” which could engage in political advocacy without exposing the cover of the press agency. Aginter also produced radio propaganda and successfully infiltrated the European far-left through the Parti Communiste Suisse/Marxiste-Leniniste.
Most troubling of all, Aginter established a covert cell within Ordre Et Tradition. Known as the Army Organization Against International Communism (Organisation Armee contre le Communisme International), its focus was on “provocation and infiltration.”
7. Organization Armee Contre Le Communisme International
The OACI was designed to function as a global paramilitary organization, and its operatives appeared in various Cold War hotspots. For instance, American Jay Sablonsky (alias Jay Salby) was trained by Aginter before leading anti-communist death squads in Guatemala. However, the OACI gained its most notoriety in Italy. Historian Giuseppe de Lutiis notes that the OACI ran bomb-making, sabotage, and covert operations courses—essentially terrorist training—attended by members of Italy's extreme right wing.
The OACI also aimed to develop a philosophy to justify terrorism. One document explained that “terrorism breaks down resistance, forces submission, and causes a rift between the populace and the authorities.” It differentiated between “selective terrorism: dismantling political and administrative structures by eliminating their leaders [and] blind terrorism: eroding the people's trust by destabilizing the masses, thereby making them easier to manipulate.”
Franco Ferraresi pointed out that the OACI documents bear a striking resemblance to later writings by Italian right-wing terrorists. Many of these terrorists, including the infamous Stefano delle Chiaie, were also members of the OACI. In this way, Aginter Press effectively became the intellectual forerunner of paramilitary groups like Ordine Nuovo, which would go on to wreak havoc during Italy's notorious “Years of Lead.”
6. Ordine Nuovo
In April 1969, two bombs exploded in busy areas of central Milan, injuring dozens. Miraculously, no one was killed, and the police quickly arrested several anarchists who were suspected of being involved. In August, near-simultaneous bombings targeted 10 trains. Once again, there were no fatalities. However, in December, Italy's luck ran out. A massive bomb detonated in the Piazza Fontana in Milan, killing 17 and injuring 90. Later that day, three more bombs went off in Rome, injuring another 17 people.
Once again, left-wing extremists were initially blamed. The police detained an anarchist railway worker named Giuseppe Pinelli, claiming that he had committed suicide by leaping from a window in the police station. (An autopsy later revealed that Pinelli was either already dead or unconscious when he fell.) The Italian public was enraged at the supposed leftist violence. However, as time passed, it became clear that the 1969 bombings were actually the work of right-wing extremists hoping to tarnish the Italian left's reputation.
The investigation particularly focused on Ordine Nuovo (ON), a far-right paramilitary group led by Pino Rauti, who had also been a journalist for Aginter Press. In 1986, a right-wing extremist named Guido Giannettini, who had helped establish the OACI with Yves Guerin-Serac, was convicted of masterminding the bombing, but he was later released on appeal. A year later, ON members Franco Freda and Giovanni Ventura were convicted for the April and August 1969 bombings but acquitted of the Piazza Fontana bombing due to lack of evidence.
In 1994, an electrician testified that he had supplied bomb timers to members of Ordine Nuovo but had been too terrified to speak out earlier due to personal threats from Pino Rauti. In 2001, three ON members were convicted for the bombing but were once again freed on appeal. In 2004, a court determined that Freda and Ventura were indeed responsible for the Piazza Fontana bombing, but Italian law prevented them from being retried due to their 1987 acquittal. While it's now clear that ON members planted the bomb, no one has been imprisoned for the Piazza Fontana massacre.
5. Avanguardia Nazionale
The bombing at Piazza Fontana marked the start of the strategy of tension, a campaign where right-wing Italian groups carried out acts of terrorism with the aim of discrediting communist and anarchist factions in Italy. Ironically, as these groups were blamed, communists and anarchists did begin conducting attacks of their own, though their targets tended to be more specific, focusing on assassinations and kidnappings rather than random civilian bombings. This turbulent time would later be referred to as the Years of Lead in Italy.
The strategy of tension closely resembled Aginter’s advocacy for false-flag operations designed to harm left-wing groups and erode the credibility of the democratic government. It’s clear that Aginter’s influence was significant. Magistrate Guido Salvini informed the Italian Senate that “evidence has surfaced confirming the links between Aginter Press, Ordine Nuovo, and Avanguardia Nazionale. [ . . . ] It has been established that Aginter Press instructors visited Rome between 1967 and 1968, teaching Avanguardia Nazionale militants how to use explosives.”
Avanguardia Nazionale, a splinter group of Ordine Nuovo, was founded by Stefano delle Chiaie, who had proven to be too extreme for Rauti’s organization. Delle Chiaie is widely believed to have masterminded several terrorist attacks, and it’s almost certain that he had a role in the Piazza Fontana bombing. He himself admitted, “We acted against the communists and the bourgeois state, against the democracy that robbed us of our freedom. And so we had to use violence.”
Like Giannettini, delle Chiaie had deep connections with Aginter Press, a group he claimed to have co-founded: “Together with my French friend (Guerin-Serac), I decided to establish Aginter Press as a platform to defend our political ideologies.”
4. La Rosa Dei Venti
Within far-right circles, there was some disagreement over what the ultimate goal of the strategy of tension should be. Some moderates believed the objective should be to establish a stronger presidency while suppressing the Communist Party. On the more radical end, the goal was to restore Fascism. Although this might sound absurd today, at the time, Italy was almost the only democracy in southern Europe. If nations like Greece, Spain, and Portugal could have right-wing dictatorships, why couldn’t Italy?
It later became clear that such a coup attempt was nearly carried out in 1970 when various extremists, including Stefano delle Chiaie, planned to overthrow the government and install Prince Valerio Borghese as the dictator. A former senior military officer under Mussolini, Borghese, known as 'the Black Prince,' was ready to announce that 'the political system that has governed us for 25 years and driven us to the brink of economic and moral ruin no longer exists.' Meanwhile, his supporters were positioned to seize key government buildings and the RAI TV studios.
For reasons that remain unclear, the coup was abruptly called off at the very last moment. (Delle Chiaie’s unit was already inside the Interior Ministry when the plan was canceled.) It’s believed that the plotters may have realized their attempt was doomed and backed out, though some alternative theories suggest that Richard Nixon intervened personally or that the presence of a Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean played a role in halting the coup.
However, the fallout from the failed coup prompted an investigation into a far-right organization called the Rosa dei Venti (“the Compass Rose”), which united several extremist groups and was a primary source of support for Borghese. In 1974, Italian authorities made a dramatic move by ordering the arrest of General Vito Miceli, head of the Italian SID intelligence agency, after it was revealed he was a prominent member of the Rosa dei Venti.
3. Gladio
At the close of World War II, the United States grew increasingly concerned about the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. By the late 1940s, NATO had decided to establish 'stay-behind' networks of agents across most European nations. These agents were armed with money and weapons, preparing to launch resistance operations if the Soviets ever invaded. In Italy, this initiative was called Operation Gladio.
Sadly, the Gladio network wasn’t content to merely wait for a Soviet invasion. The CIA recruited heavily from anti-communist radicals, including fascists, who soon redirected their efforts toward combating what they saw as Soviet infiltration. Weapons and explosives meant for Gladio operations ended up in the hands of Ordine Nuovo, and other far-right groups tied to Gladio were actively involved in the strategy of tension.
In fact, the first public acknowledgment of Gladio in Italy appears to have occurred during the 1984 trial of Vincenzo Vinciguerra, when the terrorist told the court that:
There was an organization, hidden and secret, capable of directing the strategic course of these outrages. [ . . . ] In Italy, a covert force exists alongside the military. Comprising both civilians and military personnel, with an anti-Soviet mission, this group was tasked with organizing resistance against a potential Russian invasion on Italian soil.
The precise role of the CIA in the right-wing terror campaign in Italy continues to be a subject of intense debate. Swiss historian Daniele Ganser suggested that the agency played a pivotal part in the strategy of tension. However, Ganser's research has faced significant scrutiny, including accusations of relying on documents that were likely forged by the Soviets. Regardless, it remains doubtful that the anti-American Ordine Nuovo would have taken orders from the CIA.
Italian historian Aldo Giannuli has dismissed the notion that Gladio was connected to terror attacks, instead emphasizing a parallel organization called the Nuclei for the Defense of the State. This entity, directed by the Italian army, was allegedly intended to serve a function similar to Gladio’s. Giannuli contends that the Nuclei shifted its focus to combating the internal threat of communism, while Gladio remained focused on the external threat of a Soviet invasion. As a result, the Nuclei functioned as a kind of parent organization to various fascist terror groups. Given that it was under Italian command, the exact roles, if any, played by the Americans and Gladio during the Years of Lead remain ambiguous.
2. Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari
As the 1970s progressed, the political climate began to turn more hostile for the extremists. In 1974, Portugal’s dictatorship was toppled, forcing Guerin-Serac and his Aginter operatives to flee to Franco’s Spain. There, they used their expertise in false-flag operations to bomb several Algerian embassies, aiming to discredit the Algerian opposition. At the same time, Stefano delle Chiaie also sought refuge in Spain, where he participated in the massacre of left-wing protesters.
However, Franco passed away in 1975, and his fascist regime quickly crumbled, eliminating the last safe haven for Aginter’s remnants in Europe. Guerin-Serac seems to vanish from the historical record at this point, but it’s likely he went to South America. Delle Chiaie certainly did, even establishing a Chilean press agency that was clearly inspired by Aginter. He later ended up in Bolivia, where it appears he worked as an assassin for Nazi fugitive and drug lord Klaus Barbie. Together, they played a key role in the 1980 “Cocaine Coup” that overthrew Bolivia’s government. Fortunately, the coup was short-lived, and both were eventually extradited to Europe.
Meanwhile, other factions emerged to carry on the strategy of tension in Italy, though this was increasingly disconnected from any real effort to frame communists for the violence. In 1980, a right-wing group named Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari set off a time bomb at Bologna’s Central Station, killing 85 people and injuring hundreds in the deadliest right-wing attack of the Years of Lead.
1. SID
One of the most disturbing elements of the strategy of tension is the involvement of Italy’s intelligence services. Many high-ranking officials within these agencies had close ties to the far-right groups responsible for the bombings, and they consistently helped cover up their involvement. For instance, SID assisted OACI cofounder Guido Giannettini in fleeing Italy after he came under suspicion for the Piazza Fontana bombing. The agency also obstructed investigations into right-wing terrorist acts and even attempted to help Giovanni Ventura escape from prison.
In 1980, police searched the apartment of General Gianadelio Maletti, who succeeded Vito Miceli as head of SID. Among the items found was a 1975 file mentioning an Ordine Nuovo member who had contacted the Padua police: “Casalini wants to ease his conscience. He’s begun admitting his involvement in the 1969 bombings. [ . . . ] He’s already naming names, including the Padua group, delle Chiaie, and Giannettini. He’s stating that they were all certain of the SID’s support.” The letter ended with a directive to contact the police and shut down the case before Casalini could be questioned again.
The cooperation between intelligence services and certain members of the Carabinieri police force played a crucial role in framing left-wing militants for the bombings. Two clear examples stand out. In 1972, a car bomb set by Vincenzo Vinciguerra killed three police officers. Senior intelligence and military officers fabricated evidence and “anonymous confessions” that implicated the far-left Lotta Continua group. Eventually, a general and five other officers were charged with obstructing justice for their actions.
In 1973, Gianfranco Bertoli threw a grenade during a ceremony commemorating police commander Luigi Calabrese, who had been killed by leftists seeking revenge for his alleged involvement in the death of Giuseppe Pinelli, an anarchist who mysteriously ‘fell’ from a police station window after the Piazza Fontana bombing. Bertoli admitted to being an anarchist, and SID confirmed this in their report. However, further investigation revealed that Bertoli had been influenced by the Ordine Nuovo, the group responsible for planning the attack.
+Propaganda Due
An intriguing element in the strategy of tension is the possible involvement of the Propaganda Due (P2) lodge. Exposed in 1981, the P2 was a secretive Masonic lodge that counted among its members three cabinet ministers, 43 members of parliament, the heads of Italy's three main intelligence agencies, 213 senior military officers, as well as influential figures in media and business.
The Propaganda Due lodge has been characterized as a "state within a state" and accused of attempting to undermine the Italian government. While it was likely not directly involved in the attack planning, the lodge appears to have played a role in concealing the truth. For a more detailed examination of the P2 and its potential involvement in the Bologna bombing, you can find additional information here.
