“A Leap In The Dark”

Main Lesson

The First World War marked an unparalleled disaster that profoundly influenced the contemporary era. Erik Sass is chronicling the war's events precisely a century after their occurrence. This installment is the 129th in the series. 

July 14, 1914: “A Leap In the Dark” 

On July 14, 1914—the day Austria-Hungary’s leadership resolved to wage war against Serbia—Germany’s Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg confided in his confidant and advisor, philosopher Kurt Riezler, that Germany was on the verge of taking “a leap in the dark” by endorsing the plan. In reality, both Germany and Austria-Hungary were navigating blindly, often interfering with each other as they haphazardly moved toward conflict.

By mid-July, Berlin and Vienna had reached a consensus on a single point: Austria-Hungary would exploit the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as a justification to subdue Serbia, aiming to eliminate the menace of Pan-Slav nationalism permanently. However, crucial specifics, such as the timing of the assault, were still unresolved.

Admittedly, decision-making in Austria-Hungary was never straightforward, particularly for significant matters, which were typically postponed whenever feasible. When a major decision became unavoidable, it necessitated agreement from both the Austrian and Hungarian factions of the Empire. Here, Imperial Foreign Minister Count Berchtold and chief of the general staff Conrad von Hötzendorf (both Austrians) had to persuade Hungarian Premier Count István Tisza to endorse their war strategy. Yet, Tisza was not easily swayed, even by the backing of Emperor Franz Josef.

Wikimedia Commons (1, 2, 3) 

After the initial crown council on July 7, Tisza remained deeply skeptical about the proposed attack on Serbia, cautioning that it might provoke a conflict with Russia, Serbia’s ally. To mitigate this risk, he insisted that Austria-Hungary first present its case diplomatically by compiling evidence of Serbian involvement, followed by a “final opportunity” for Serbia to comply. This led to the creation of the ultimatum strategy by Berchtold, serving as a diplomatic cover: Austria-Hungary would assemble proof of Serbian complicity and then issue demands so extreme that Serbia would have no choice but to refuse.

Between July 10 and 14, 1914, events aligned to finally convince Tisza to join the war faction. His demand for evidence was met by Baron Friedrich von Wiesner’s investigation, which began in Sarajevo on July 11. By July 13, Wiesner’s preliminary report exonerated Serbia’s government but implicated Serbian army officers, asserting there was “little doubt that the assassination was planned in Belgrade with the involvement of Serbian officials…” 

During this period, Austria secured a neutrality pledge from Romania in case of war, alleviating Tisza’s concerns about potential unrest among Hungary’s Romanian population. However, the decisive factor was Berlin’s stance. Tisza understood Austria-Hungary’s reliance on Germany for protection, and Berchtold emphasized that Berlin expected Vienna to resolve the Serbian issue immediately—failure to do so might lead Germany to question the alliance’s value.

The foreign minister highlighted a series of messages from Berlin advocating for decisive action (possibly orchestrated by Berchtold himself to sway Tisza). On July 12, Count Szőgyény, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Berlin, informed Vienna that “Kaiser Wilhelm and other key figures strongly urge us to act decisively against Serbia and eliminate the revolutionary threat permanently.” Regarding the risk of a broader conflict, the Germans believed “Russia might not intervene militarily if Serbia is attacked… Additionally, Germany is confident that England would not engage in a war over Balkan affairs at this time…”

As a conservative nobleman, Tisza’s primary objective was upholding the traditional order, particularly the preservation of the Hapsburg monarchy, the foundation of political legitimacy. Combined with evidence of Serbian involvement and German pressure, Tisza finally relented. At the second crown council meeting on July 14, 1914, he approved the plan for an ultimatum followed by war. While this decision should have been celebrated in Vienna and Berlin, the allies disagreed on timing, with Germany pushing for swift action and Austria requesting a delay.

Critical Delays

The first issue arose when chief of the general staff Conrad discovered that much of Austria-Hungary’s military was on summer leave until late July. Additionally, Berchtold and his ministers were aware that French President Raymond Poincaré and Premier René Viviani were scheduled to visit Russia from July 20-23. If the ultimatum were issued during their stay, the French and Russian leaders could coordinate a response in person—precisely what Berchtold aimed to avoid. Conversely, delaying the ultimatum until after the visit would leave the French leaders isolated at sea, with unreliable long-distance communication. The sudden death of Russia’s ambassador to Serbia, Baron Nicholas Hartwig, on July 10 further complicated matters (his heart attack at the Austro-Hungarian embassy sparked rumors of foul play).

Starting with the crown council on July 14, the Austrians devised a strategy involving large-scale deception. They planned to present the ultimatum to Serbia on the evening of July 23, once Poincaré and Viviani were at sea, allowing Belgrade 48 hours to respond. This would enable immediate mobilization by July 25. Until then, Vienna and Berlin would maintain a peaceful facade to mislead Russia, France, and Britain into complacency.

The Germans were displeased with Vienna’s decision to delay until late July, arguing that swift action would catch the Triple Entente off guard. On July 11, Riezler noted Bethmann-Hollweg’s frustration: “[The Austrians] seem to need an excessively long time to mobilize… This is highly risky. A rapid fait accompli, followed by a conciliatory approach to the Entente, might help us weather the storm.” Similarly, on July 13, German chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke (on vacation in Karlsbad, Bohemia) insisted, “Austria must defeat Serbia swiftly and then seek peace.”

The Italian Question

Berlin and Vienna also clashed over whether to inform Italy, the unreliable third member of the Triple Alliance, about their plans. The only way to secure Italy’s cooperation in an aggressive war was through territorial concessions—specifically Austria’s Italian-speaking regions of Trentino and Trieste (highlighted in red), which Italian nationalists viewed as essential to completing a unified Italy. However, the Germans and Austrians were divided: while Germany was willing to sacrifice parts of its ally’s territory, Austria was unwilling to relinquish lands that had been part of the Hapsburg legacy for centuries. 

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As early as June 30, Tschirschky, the German ambassador to Vienna, advised Berchtold to involve Italy in their plans, reiterating this suggestion to Emperor Franz Josef on July 2. However, the Austrians dismissed these concerns. The matter resurfaced in subsequent weeks when it became evident that Italy might not remain neutral if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. On July 10, Italy’s Foreign Minister San Giuliano (pictured above) informed German ambassador Baron Ludwig von Flotow that Italy would demand compensation, specifically the Austrian Trentino, for any Balkan expansion by Austria-Hungary. Alarmed by Italy’s stance, German Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow, on July 15, urged Austria-Hungary to confide in Italy, as he communicated to Tschirschky in Vienna:

I am certain that in an Austro-Serbian conflict, [Italian public opinion] would favor Serbia. Any territorial expansion or increased influence by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans is seen as a threat to Italy’s position there… Therefore, it is crucial that Vienna discusses its objectives with the Italian government to secure its support or, at the very least, ensure its neutrality… Confidential sources indicate that Italy would only consider the Trentino as adequate compensation.

Once again, Vienna ignored Germany’s warnings. Frustrated, the Germans acted independently on July 11, with Flotow discreetly outlining Austria-Hungary’s plans to Foreign Minister San Giuliano. This leak backfired, as San Giuliano alerted Italy’s ambassadors across Europe about Austria-Hungary’s intentions. Given the widespread practice of intercepting diplomatic communications, Russian intelligence likely decrypted these messages, informing Russian diplomats, who then shared the information with France and Britain. Consequently, Poincaré and Viviani were likely aware of the situation when they met the tsar and his ministers from July 20 to 23, allowing ample time to strategize their response.

See the previous installment or all entries.