Buzz
bildarchivaustria.at
The First World War marked a catastrophic turning point that reshaped the modern era. Erik Sass is chronicling the war's events a century after they unfolded. This is the 127th installment in the series.
On July 5, 1914, Germany Assures Austria-Hungary of Full Support
The infamous 'blank check' represents a critical misstep in World War I's history, as Germany vowed unwavering support for Austria-Hungary's actions against Serbia, setting the stage for further escalation.
After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Vienna's top officials concluded that Serbia, a persistent irritant to the Dual Monarchy, must be decisively dealt with. However, Austria-Hungary required a formal assurance of German backing. This set the stage for the “Hoyos Mission” on July 4-5, 1914, when Foreign Minister Berchtold sent his chief of staff, Count Alexander von Hoyos (pictured above), to Berlin with a personal letter from Emperor Franz Josef to Kaiser Wilhelm II. The aging monarch was unequivocal:
The assault on my dear nephew stems directly from the propaganda spread by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole objective is to undermine the Triple Alliance and dismantle my Empire… [T]he Sarajevo incident is not merely the act of a lone assassin but part of a meticulously planned conspiracy with roots extending to Belgrade… [T]he persistence of this situation poses an ongoing threat to my dynasty and my realm.
Franz Josef further suggested reshaping the Balkan power structure by aligning Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire – “However, this cannot be achieved unless Serbia, currently the linchpin of Pan-Slavist ambitions, is removed as a political force in the Balkans.” In essence, the path to Balkan stability required Serbia's elimination. An accompanying memo highlighted the Pan-Slav menace to Germany:
Russia's strategy of encircling the Monarchy… aims ultimately to render the German Empire incapable of resisting Russian dominance or its political and economic supremacy. Consequently, Austria-Hungary's foreign policy leaders are certain that it is in the shared interest of both the Monarchy and Germany to vigorously and promptly counter the Balkan crisis developments, which Russia has anticipated and encouraged through a premeditated scheme.
While the letter and memo did not explicitly demand support—Austrian diplomacy was too refined and proud for such directness—they unmistakably conveyed Austria-Hungary's request for German assistance in a high-stakes endeavor that could lead to war with Russia. Count Szőgyény, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, made this plea unmistakably clear during his July 5 lunch with Wilhelm. Simultaneously, Hoyos presented the case to Arthur Zimmerman, the German undersecretary for foreign affairs, who was temporarily filling in for the honeymooning Foreign Secretary Jagow.
During their lunch meeting, Wilhelm assured Szőgyény that he recognized the necessity for “strong actions” against Serbia, stating, “he had no doubt that [Chancellor] Bethmann von Hollweg would fully share his perspective” in supporting war. Zimmerman reinforced this stance, telling Hoyos that Germany believed “immediate action against Serbia was the most effective and decisive way to resolve the Balkan challenges.”
Wikimedia Commons [1,2,3,4]
Later that evening, the Kaiser convened with Bethmann-Hollweg, Zimmerman, and chief of the general staff Helmuth von Moltke, informing them of his provisional pledge of support to Szőgyény, which they unanimously endorsed. By 10 p.m. on July 5, Szőgyény relayed to Berchtold in Vienna that Germany’s “unwavering support” was guaranteed, regardless of the outcome. The following day, Bethmann-Hollweg assured Franz Josef that “His Majesty would steadfastly support Austria-Hungary, in line with the obligations of their alliance...”
The Germans appeared unusually calm after the July 5 discussions: no one deemed it necessary to summon Foreign Secretary Jagow from his honeymoon, and the Kaiser departed the next day for his customary summer cruise on the royal yacht in the Norwegian fjords. Meanwhile, Moltke, still unwell, resumed his extended vacation, seeking a “spa cure” in Karlsbad, Bohemia.
The Germans convinced themselves that Russia would not support Serbia, but this assumption was overly optimistic. In reality, Russia was already showing signs of concern. On July 6, Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov cautioned the Austro-Hungarian charge d’affaires in St. Petersburg, Count Otto von Czernin, that it would be “risky” for Austria-Hungary to link the Sarajevo plot to Serbia. He added that St. Petersburg would oppose any unreasonable demands on Belgrade. However, Sazonov’s warnings, like others that followed, were brushed off as mere “bluff.”
The “blank check” issued on July 5 was primarily a display of German carelessness, particularly because it overlooked critical details such as the timing of subsequent actions. Berlin anticipated that Vienna would act swiftly against Serbia while the Sarajevo assassinations were still recent, presenting the Triple Entente with a sudden, irreversible outcome and potentially reducing the likelihood of a broader conflict. Instead, they encountered the quintessential Austrian tendencies that frustrated the methodical Prussians: hesitation, evasion, and procrastination.
The delays began on July 6, when chief of the general staff Conrad revealed that many of the Dual Monarchy’s forces were on summer leave, including a significant portion of Hungarian troops assisting with the early harvest. This inconvenient development—the first of many for Austria-Hungary—meant mobilization could not commence until around July 25 at the earliest. The longer the delay, the more opportunity Russia, France, and Britain had to strategize and coordinate a unified response.
See the previous installment or all entries.
