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World War I was a monumental disaster that redefined the modern era. Erik Sass is documenting the war's events precisely a century after they unfolded. This marks the 128th entry in his series.
July 7-9, 1914: The Ultimatum Strategy
Following assurances of German backing for their intended conflict with Serbia, Emperor Franz Josef departed for his summer residence in Bad Ischl on July 7, 1914. Meanwhile, his council of ministers reconvened in Vienna to deliberate their next steps. However, one key figure remained to be convinced: Hungarian Premier Count István Tisza (left).
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As the political head of Hungary within the Dual Monarchy, Tisza's endorsement was crucial, yet far from guaranteed. The conservative Magyar elites, who dominated Hungary, believed their kingdom already housed too many unruly Slavs. As their representative, Tisza was compelled to resist any scheme that included annexing Serbian land. This posed a dilemma, as Austria aimed to eradicate Serbia as a sovereign nation. The question then arose: what would become of its territory?
Foreign Minister Berchtold (center) devised a shrewd plan, assuring Tisza that Austria-Hungary would not annex any territory. Instead, most of Serbia’s land would be distributed to neighboring Bulgaria and Albania, with a puppet regime established over the remainder (top). While this promise might have been insincere—Vienna was unlikely to relinquish its conquests after such sacrifices—it satisfied Tisza, who could now assure his people that the Empire would not incorporate more Slavs.
To appease Tisza, Berchtold abandoned his proposal for a surprise assault on Serbia, which the Hungarian leader feared would provoke Russia. Instead, he agreed to Tisza’s insistence on using diplomacy to create a credible justification for war. Tisza outlined his terms in a letter to Emperor Franz Josef on July 8:
An attack on Serbia would, as far as humanly predictable, draw Russia into the conflict, sparking a world war... Therefore, in my view, Serbia should be offered a chance to avert war through a significant diplomatic setback. If war becomes inevitable, it must be clear to the world that we are acting in legitimate self-defense...
This marked the birth of the ultimatum plan, a cunning strategy designed to portray Austria-Hungary as pursuing peace before resorting to military action. Essentially, Berchtold suggested delivering Belgrade an ultimatum with terms so extreme that Serbia could never comply, providing Austria-Hungary with the justification for war. Above all, Berchtold and General Staff Chief Conrad (right) agreed that Austria-Hungary must avoid being pressured into a mediated solution by other Great Powers, as had happened at the Conference of London. This time, they were determined to resolve the Serbian issue permanently.
A critical question lingered: Would Russia intervene to aid Serbia? The Austrians and Germans attempted to convince themselves otherwise, citing various reasons—some more plausible than others. They hoped Tsar Nicholas II would refuse to support assassins, especially given the murders of several of his predecessors. Additionally, they speculated that Russia, despite its rapid military buildup, was not yet ready for war. Lastly, they anticipated that France and Britain would temper their ally’s actions.
These assumptions were all proven wrong. While Nicholas II indeed opposed regicides, Serbia had its own monarchy, and Russia could challenge the evidence tying Sarajevo to Serbia. Moreover, although Russia hadn’t reached peak military readiness, by early 1914, the tsar’s ministers determined they were prepared for a land war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, instead of restraining Russia, France had been encouraging greater assertiveness since the Second Moroccan Crisis. Finally, Germany and Austria underestimated Russia’s reliance on Serbia, its last ally in the Balkans, especially after alienating Bulgaria.
In reality, they never fully believed their own reasoning. On July 6, the same day Kaiser Wilhelm II assured acting Navy Minister Capelle that he “did not foresee major military complications,” German undersecretary Arthur Zimmerman told Austro-Hungarian envoy Alexander von Hoyos, who secured German support for war, “There’s a 90 percent chance of a European war if you act against Serbia.” The following day, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg confided to his friend Kurt Riezler that attacking Serbia “could spark a world war,” while Berchtold in Vienna informed his ministers that he was “certain a war with Russia would likely follow an invasion of Serbia.” (He later altered the minutes to suggest war “might” result.)
How can this paradoxical “double-think” be explained, where German and Austro-Hungarian leaders simultaneously held conflicting beliefs? Ultimately, it may reflect the prevailing fatalism in both capitals. Berlin and Vienna clung to the hope that Russia would avoid a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia—yet rationalized that if Russia intervened, it would present an opportunity to confront the eastern empire before it grew stronger. Similarly, they hoped France and Britain would remain neutral—but if they didn’t, it would confirm a conspiracy of encirclement, necessitating a preemptive strike before it was too late.
The specter of encirclement haunted Germany. On July 7, 1914, Riezler documented his conversation with Bethmann-Hollweg:
The confidential reports he shares with me paint a troubling picture. He views the Anglo-Russian naval discussions … as highly significant, the final piece in a growing chain of threats … Russia’s military capabilities are expanding rapidly; their strategic railway developments in Poland make them an unstoppable force. Meanwhile, Austria is becoming increasingly feeble and stagnant … The future is Russia’s, as it continues to grow, becoming an ever-heavier burden pressing upon us.
Against this backdrop, after years of escalating tension and conflict, the choice for war unfolded with unavoidable logic and gained its own unstoppable momentum. The hand of destiny was in motion, and as Bethmann-Hollweg cautioned Riezler, the result would signify “the collapse of the existing order.”
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